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Bound by the Economic Constitution: 




Abstract: The aspiration of this article is to start a conversation about the possible contribution of 
a Law and Political Economy research agenda in Europe. I first unpack the role of law in 
structuring the economy at the supranational level by examining the legacy of ordoliberalism and 
the Economic Constitution of the EU as the normative project of insulating the internal market 
from political contestation. I then attempt to map the critical approaches that challenge the 
depoliticization of the economy and constitute the backdrop for an emerging LPE agenda. In 
particular, I discuss negative universalism, which focuses on the legal form as a limit to power and as 
enabling particular causes to make claims in universal terms; instrumentalism, which favors 
politicizing the law to advance egalitarian agendas; and counter-hegemony, which looks to civil society 
and to social transformation beyond the state. Concluding with a call for pragmatic and contextual 
critical practice, I attempt to carve out a space for an LPE in Europe agenda rooted in the 
normative commitment to democracy and equality as a form of immanent critique, in the 
aspiration to use institutions for social transformation, and in an orientation towards democratic 
power-building. 
 
Keywords:  Economic constitution, ordoliberalism, EU, depoliticization, critical approaches to law, 





The emergence of a new Law and Political Economy (LPE) approach in the legal academy of the 
US invites a reckoning of the legal orthodoxies and legal imaginaries also in Europe. In the US, 
LPE constitutes a challenge to the “twentieth century synthesis” of a private law framework 
oriented towards economic efficiency and wealth maximization, and a public law framework that 
excludes questions of economic power from its ambit (Britton-Purdy et al. 2020). Building on the 
Legal Realist project to uncover the role of the law in the production and distribution of wealth 
and private power, LPE is premised on an understanding of the economy as a product of legal 
ordering. Law is not merely an external regulatory force superimposed on otherwise “natural” and 
“neutral” markets. Rather, it is an intrinsic part of the creation of markets in the first place, as its 
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permissions, prohibitions, and entitlements backed up by public power determine the bargaining 
power of different actors (Hale 1923; Kennedy 1991).  
 
Taking power as a central unit of analysis then develops into a methodological aspect of LPE. In 
this context, “methodological” is not meant to refer to a fully fleshed-out set of rules or principles 
employed to carry out research, but rather to the prioritization of certain analytical questions in 
the study of legal arrangements. The study of the distributive and power-structuring effects of the 
law means that the principal question that has to be prioritized is whom law endows with 
bargaining power and with what justification (Britton-Purdy et al. 2020, 1821). Instead of asking 
whether legal arrangements maximize efficiency—the principal question that structures the 
methodology of Law and Economics—LPE scholarship attempts to locate the way in which legal 
structures, in different fields, might generate private power, and how they possibly insulate such 
power from democratic control and contestation (for an example, see Kapczynski 2020).  
 
Crucially, the analytical and methodological priorities put forward by LPE are underpinned by a 
set of normative commitments and aspirations. The emphasis on law’s constitutive role in the 
economy entails an implicit assumption that the law can also be instrumental for social 
transformation. If it is legal rules that establish regimes of socio-economic inequality, hierarchy, 
and structural exclusion, then legal rules, as the expression of citizen self-rule, could also undo 
them. In that direction, LPE prompts a shift from the supposed normative “neutrality” of market 
ordering to a moral vision of a democratic political economy (Britton-Purdy et al. 2020, 1832). It 
points to a reinvigoration of substantive ideas of freedom and equality, while it seeks to trace paths 
of reconstituting public power and asserting social priorities through the political medium.   
 
In this article, I aspire to start a conversation about the role and possible contribution of an LPE 
research agenda in Europe (Kjaer 2020a; Haskell and Rasulov 2018). With that goal in mind, I 
attempt to map the critical approaches that challenge the role of the law in the prioritization of 
liberal economic commitments—including market freedoms, undistorted competition, and 
monetary stability—at the expense of democratic participation and social welfare considerations, 
in the context of the EU. The attempt to open a transatlantic channel of dialogue and cross-
fertilization is supported by two considerations. First, most of the empirical findings that originally 
fuelled the emergence of LPE are not instances of American exceptionalism, but rather concrete 
manifestations of the political and ideological neoliberal hegemony that has similarly—even if 
perhaps to a different degree—seeped into European political and economic structures (Schröder 
et al. 2020; Lindberg 2019; Kjaer 2020b). Similarly, social inequalities based on established 
hierarchies of gender, race, and residence status persist, not only in the US, but also in Europe, 
and are internal in the shaping of political economy (Zbyszewska 2016; Kantola and Lombardo 
2017; Möschel 2009; Mantouvalou 2020). As a result, the normative vision of LPE seems to be 
relevant for Europe as well. Second, while LPE is presented in its “foundational” texts (Britton-
Purdy et al. 2020; Purdy, Kapczynski, and Grewal 2017) as primarily building on the work of 
American Legal Realists, the early American progressives themselves had a kinship with European 
social thought, including for example Marxian materialism and Weberian perspectives on coercion 
and freedom (Fried 2009; Joerges, Trubek, and Zumbansen 2011). In a way, LPE has “multiple 
beginnings” (Said 1983) that are worthy of being resurfaced, some of which originated and 
continue to be influential in Europe. At the same time, the foundational premise of LPE, that law 
is constitutive of the economy, has profound roots in European legal and social theory (Kjaer 
2020b; Wiethölter 1968; Neumann 1996; Polanyi 2001). Importantly, the attempt to 
transnationalize the discourse of LPE has the potential to affect the discourse within US legal 
scholarship as well, both by prompting comparative exercises and by pronouncing more clearly 
the paradigm shift entailed by globalization, forcing a universal nuancing of legal theory that is 
overly attuned to the nation-state model.  




Advancing an agenda of LPE in Europe might initially appear ambitious as it encounters the 
obstacle of institutional fragmentation (multiple national legal systems, different legal traditions, 
diversity of political economies) and the challenge of becoming meaningful in a diverse scholarly 
and theoretical landscape. However, both of these challenges can be overcome without thinning 
its prospective agenda. With regard to the legal and constitutional fragmentation, as well the diverse 
trajectories of institutions and different economic formations, European unification provides a 
strong point of reference for a transnational research agenda. Even if one cannot speak of one 
“Europe” or one single “European capitalism” (Esping-Andersen 1990; Offe 2003; Hall and 
Soskice 2001), the process of European integration has created a shared institutional substratum 
for the member states, while the financial crisis of 2008 highlighted the interconnections of 
European economies and the inescapability of supranational ordering. In the core of the European 
legal order is the Economic Constitution, the ensemble of rules that undergird the supranational 
economy and which, in their fundamental goal to create and protect the internal market, have 
consistently performed the function of insulating the economy from democratic contestation. The 
Economic Constitution, as both a driving force in shaping the political economy of the continent 
and a recipient of numerous and diverse challenges, provides an opportunity to highlight how 
unifying normative projects of legal critique can be meaningful.  
 
With regards to the diverse theoretical landscape, I will argue that, building on existing work and 
drawing eclectically and pragmatically from the currently predominant ways of thinking critically 
about the role of law for social transformation in Europe, LPE in Europe can constitute a powerful 
emerging research agenda. In parallel to the engagement with theoretical diversity, LPE in Europe 
could enable the development of methodological commonality by focusing on the role of legal 
structures, at both the supranational and the national level, in generating private power and 
consolidating hierarchies along lines of class, race, and gender. Drawing from existing critical work 
at the intersection of law and political economy in Europe, as well as from the developing LPE 
scholarship in the US, I also attempt to tentatively outline the substantive underpinnings of such 
an emerging agenda. These could be (1) the grounding of legal critique on normative commitments 
to democracy and equality as an instantiation of immanent critique, going beyond market-based 
equalization of economic opportunity to convey aspirations of substantive equality; (2) the drive 
to translate legal critique into concrete legal and institutional change without, nevertheless, 
fetishizing the latter or perceiving it as the end of politics; and, finally, (3) an orientation towards 
democratic and public power-building, which is not necessarily confined within traditional 
structures of government, but may also extend in different social spheres, such as structures of 
transnational governance, the workplace, etc. 
 
In Part II, I outline the form, content, and function of the Economic Constitution of the EU, with 
the goal to highlight the role of the law in the structuring of the economy at the supranational 
level. I make the argument that the Economic Constitution consists fundamentally of the 
normative project to inoculate the economy and particularly the functioning of the internal market 
from democratic contestation. As such, the depoliticization of the economy becomes a 
transcontinental constant and an orthodoxy that allows us to draw parallels between the function 
of the ordoliberal guiding philosophy of the European Economic Constitution on the one hand, 
and the function of Law and Economics scholarship in the US on the other hand (Britton-Purdy 
et. al. 2020, 1789-1790).  In its original ordoliberal form, the Economic Constitution employed 
hard rules, often developed by means of judicial legislation, to encase market freedoms, 
undistorted competition, and monetary stability against political interference. However, the 
financial crisis gave rise to new forms of governance characterized by profound elasticity in their 
understanding of the rule of law, circumventing fundamental commitments of democratic 
constitutionalism in order to safeguard these core economic liberal commitments (Joerges 2014a, 
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2014b; Wilkinson 2019). The pragmatic and jurisprudentially flexible vision of a depoliticized 
economy sets explicit and implicit boundaries on how different member states structure or even 
imagine social ordering, while it also underpins and fuels diverse voices of contestation.  
 
In the following parts, I attempt to map certain prominent ways of criticizing the function of law 
in economic reproduction, with a focus on European scholarship. These critical perspectives also 
provide a window into alternative forms and functions of law. This mapping is meant to serve as 
a theoretical backdrop for synthesis and the elaboration of a new agenda, providing the outlines 
of the approaches from which an emerging LPE in Europe research agenda could selectively 
draw.1   
In Part III, I discuss the critical approach of negative universalism. Positive universalism signifies the 
attempt to challenge the increasing de-juridification of the Economic Constitution and its 
“democratic deficit” by promoting the deepening of constitutionalization and institutional fixes. 
By contrast, negative universalism suggests that it is impossible to articulate a positive universalism 
without reinforcing currently hegemonic positions. Yet, within the form of law there is a residue of 
universalism that is worth safeguarding. This is not only because the legal form may set limits on 
the exercise of power. It is also because law, as a result of its indeterminacy, enables particular 
identities and causes to make their claims in universal terms, transmitting them beyond their 
separate value-systems. The modest vision of negative universalism is that law is the space that 
guarantees that politics do not degenerate to a clash of incommensurate value-systems. 
Nevertheless, the jurisprudential defense of the legal form as a restraint of power and as vessel for 
possibly radical claims does not appear as a sufficient challenge to a pragmatic and flexible project 
of depoliticizing the economy, not least because clinging to legal indeterminacy may obscure the 
need to change the content of the law.  
 
In Part IV, I examine instrumentalism. Undergirded by the notion that capitalism is a product of 
legal ordering, instrumentalist perspectives highlight the power of the agent of legal ordering for 
shaping the economy and steering society. Law is understood as non-autonomous and inherently 
political, able to advance or hinder different agendas. The normative goal becomes to orient legal 
coding towards goals of substantive equality and democratic participation. Popular sovereignty 
contestations for the determination of the content of law are then perceived as the means for social 
transformation. Yet, instrumentalism and its inspiration from the welfare state and social 
citizenship are challenged, first, by the limits of the ordering capacities of law in the globalized 
economy and, second, by the limits of the liberal legal form itself.   
 
In Part V, I turn to counter-hegemonic approaches, which resist the subsumption of emancipatory 
politics under the umbrella of state power while identifying civil society and social movements as 
crucial factors in triggering social and legal transformation. Within the category of counter-
hegemony, I distinguish between, on one hand, theoretical endeavors invested in the project of 
democratizing the economy from within, drawing from a system-theoretical conceptual 
background (Luhmann 2008; Teubner 1993), and, on the other hand, critical approaches that view 
legal reforms as inherently limited, reserving a special role for the critical practice itself and the 
utopian energies it might catalyze. However, the project of democratizing the economy from 
within may reify unequal social and market power by relying on a social sphere that has been 
shaped and determined by patterns of social hierarchy and distributional inequality. At the same 
 
1 A word of caution is merited with regards to the proposed categorization of the different directions of critique, 
which is that it engages in the “anthropomorphic fallacy” (Harris 1994, 744) of creating arbitrary and unifying thinking 
and speaking subjects where none exists. In that sense, the grouping of different perspectives does not necessarily 
reflect the self-description of the authors, nor is it meant to characterize the entirety of their work but rather particular 
positions. The categorization is undertaken for analytical purposes.  
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time, the more radical agenda of relying on bottom-up mobilization and the normative pluralism 
of social movements risks underestimating the importance of legal centralism for social 
transformation.  
 
In the Conclusion, I draw selectively from the above directions, and particularly from a reimagined 
instrumentalism and counter-hegemony, as well as from the US LPE scholarship, to delineate 
certain possible core features of an emerging LPE-in-Europe research agenda. As mentioned 
above, these could be the methodological commonality around the exposure of the constitutive 
function of law in the economy and a substantive component regarding the motivations, the 
purpose, and the goals of legal analysis. This component consists of a set of commitments to 
egalitarian politics, the aspiration to use institutions to advance social transformation, and an ethics 
of participatory parity revolving around democratic, public power. Yet, LPE is not only a scholarly 
but also a political project and movement. In that direction, the paper concludes with a call for a 
flexible, pragmatic, and contextual critical practice in line with social movements that share and 
materialize the goals and aspirations of LPE.     
 
II. Ordoliberalism and the Substance of the Economic Constitution 
A core element of European integration—and what I argue could be a centripetal force for a 
research agenda of LPE in Europe—is the Economic Constitution, which, I suggest, signifies the 
project of insulating the economy from political contestation. This functional understanding of 
the European Constitution marks a constant of continuity for an otherwise changing legal form 
and political practice in the EU and across Europe. While the original ordoliberal impetus was to 
employ hard rules to insulate market freedoms, undistorted competition, and monetary stability 
from political interference, current modes of EU governance have pursued the same end by 
showing profound elasticity in their understanding of the rule of law. It can be inferred that 
European ordoliberalism is not fundamentally about form; the connection between hard rules and 
the Economic Constitution is contingent.2 Rather, European ordoliberalism is fundamentally 
about a broader political vision of a depoliticized economy, the achievement of which eventually 
relies on acts of political will that can either entrench legal formalism or circumvent it, focusing 
on the imagined telos of the Union (Böhm 1937, 54-56; Mestmäcker 1969, 170-173; Slobodian 
2018, 210-214). 
 
Ordoliberalism, one of the influential building blocks of the European institutional edifice, 
(Joerges 2004; Gerber 1994; Feld, Köhler, and Nientiedt 2015) sprang from the Freiburg School 
following the fall of the Weimar Republic. Its key differentiation from its liberal predecessors was 
stressing that a liberal economic regime cannot result from a spontaneous natural order of laissez-
faire. With the experience of inter-war corporatism fresh in their minds, the ordoliberals suggested 
that social progress was preconditioned on the existence of a legal framework that protects markets 
against political interference. Market freedoms, undistorted competition, and monetary stability 
were seen as key to economic prosperity and, eventually, social welfare (Möschel 1989). Such 
conditions had to be guaranteed through an “Economic Constitution.” According to the Freiburg 
School’s most prominent legal theoretician, Franz Böhm, an Economic Constitution is “a 
comprehensive decision (Gesamtentscheidung) concerning the nature (Art) and form of the process 
of socio-economic cooperation” (Böhm 1933, 107). As Gerber insightfully points out, this concept 
“turned the core idea of classical liberalism—that the economy should be divorced from law and 
politics—on its head by arguing that the characteristics and the effectiveness of the economy 
depended on its relationship to the political and legal systems” (Gerber 1994, 45). Crucially, the 
 
2 For a contrary argument, see Hien and Joerges (2018). 
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Economic Constitution was not conceived as a testament to the normative primacy of politics 
over the economy, but rather as an attempt to impose a stable legal framework on the economy, 
which the political system itself would have to respect. 
 
Following Hayek’s influence in the development of the ordoliberal agenda, ordoliberalism has 
been understood as the application of a formalist understanding of the “rule of law” in the 
economic realm (Foucault 2008, 171). In that sense, the rule of law means that government action 
is bound by fixed rules, which not only make it possible to foresee the exercise of state coercion, 
but also do not distinguish between the needs and wants of different people, regardless of their 
place in society (Hayek 2001 [1944], 77). In other words, governments need to abstain from the 
necessarily partial, substantive legal rationalities that underpinned economic intervention and 
planning. This type of formalism is, according to Foucault, “the opposite of a plan,” the categorical 
rejection of the idea that the law could pursue particular economic ends (Foucault 2008, 172; 
Hayek 2001 [1944]). Instead, law is defined by its “neutrality” and “objectivity” which enable and 
safeguard private economic initiative. However, the identification of ordoliberalism with 
formalism and hard rules (Hayek 2001 [1944]) elevates a historically specific, jurisprudential 
component of a broader project of social ordering into its essential characteristic. Indeed, as I will 
show below, recent developments in European economic governance reveal how the Economic 
Constitution maintains its normative thrust despite the adoption of discretionary measures that sit 
uneasily with strict adherence to the rule of law.  
 
European integration, starting with the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, reflected the premises of ordoliberal thought in its structural 
orientation towards guaranteeing economic freedoms, safeguarding a system of undistorted 
competition, and sidelining dimensions of social policy, which remained under the auspices of the 
political autonomy of member states. Yet, even in its final form, itself a product of political 
compromise between the competing trends of ordoliberalism and dirigisme (Warlouzet 2019), the 
Treaty did not gain unanimous acceptance in the neoliberal camp, facing the skepticism of those 
that saw simply a more advanced and geographically extended form of protectionism (Slobodian 
2018, 182-184). It would, then, be hasty to characterize the EEC as neoliberally “biased” from the 
outset, as if embedded with the inherent goal to reverse European welfare states, especially 
considering that the governance of the social was to remain intact from market-building processes 
and under the democratic governance of member states.3 Yet, the political decoupling of economic 
integration and social protection laid the groundwork for the emergence of a fundamental 
constitutional asymmetry.  
 
This asymmetry was the result of economic policies benefiting from the supreme status of 
European law, whereas welfare-state policies were confined to the eventually hierarchically inferior 
status of national law (Scharpf 2002, 647). Indeed, the pronouncements by the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) of the doctrines of “direct effect” of EU law (Van Gend En Loos, 26/62, 1963), 
granting subjective rights to individuals against states, and of “supremacy,” asserting the supremacy 
of the European legal order over the law of member states (Costa v. ENEL, 6/64, 1964), embedded 
this constitutional asymmetry (Weiler 1991). Using the law “as a mask for politics” (Burley and 
Mattli 1993, 44) helped immunize judicial law-making against political objections and the 
possibility of reversal (Scharpf 2010, 216-217). Grimm (2015, 469-471) has described this process 
as the “overconstitutionalization” of the EU, shifting power from the member states to the non-
political institutions of the EU and immunizing the latter against public pressure. European law, 
as interpreted by the ECJ, is woven into the institutional fabric of member states through its 
application by national courts in ordinary litigation. As such, it cannot be challenged by 
 
3 According to Rödl (2009), the “social compromise for integration;” see also Majone (2014). 
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governments without threatening to destabilize the rule of law upon which their legitimacy also 
depends (Scharpf 2010, 217; Mestmäcker 1973, 108-109). Furthermore, political reversal of ECJ 
decisions and interpretations through, for example, treaty amendments, is extremely challenging 
in a Union characterized by a diversity of national interests. Integration through law, rather than 
politics, has come at a cost. Insulating the project of the creation of the internal market from 
democratic contestation was structural in generating a systemic “democratic deficit” in the EU, 
especially with regards to the input legitimacy of European citizens (Nanopoulos and Vergis 2019; 
Isiksel 2016). Indeed, according to Isiksel, the finalité economique that is at the core of European 
constitutionalism structurally precludes the kind of mass participation in politics that could 
destabilize the economic telos of the Union (Isiksel 2016). 
 
Integration through law was fundamental in shaping the content of the Economic Constitution. 
One of its crucial substantive features has been the elimination of barriers that restrict the 
movement of goods, services, and factors of production through a process of “negative 
integration” (Scharpf 1999; Case C-8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Benoît and Gustave Dassonville; Case C-
120/78, Rewe-Zentral v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon)). On the one hand, this 
process has expanded individual rights beyond a narrowly understood process of “market 
liberalization,” for example by guaranteeing the social rights of migrant workers against 
discrimination or solidifying a workplace-oriented regime of gender equality (Cichowski 2004).4 
However, on the other hand, as Scharpf highlights, the notion of European citizenship advanced 
by the Court remains disconnected from any vision of collective self-determination and democratic 
participation (Scharpf 2010, 223). It denotes individual rights of entry and exit into democratically 
shaped systems of national solidarity (Somek 2008), but it does not reflect the aspiration that 
citizens understand themselves as the authors of their own laws. Therefore, while integration 
through law has propelled the deregulation of national regimes of solidarity—which, of course, 
cannot be simply attributed to developments in EU law5—its rights-based structure cannot, 
unaccompanied by political initiatives, commence a process of re-regulation and establish norms 
of solidarity that would turn the Union into a “social market economy” (Müller-Armack 1978). 
  
The ordoliberal vision of an economic policy beyond political contestation also began to expand 
in the realm of monetary policy, with a focus on monetary stability (Eucken 2004), with the 
introduction of the single currency, as set out by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. In deciding on the 
status of the treaty, the German Constitutional Court described economic integration as an 
autonomous and apolitical process taking place beyond the political influence of member states, 
requiring only the functional legitimacy derived from its institutional commitment to price stability 
and against excessive fiscal deficits. Brunner v. European Union Treaty, 1 CMLR 57 (1994). The 
subsequent establishment of the European Central Bank, legally shielded from political 
interference with a high degree of independence and with the maintenance of price stability as its 
foundational purpose, was a further entrenchment of the Economic Constitution in the form of 
hard legal rules. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
Articles 130, 282–284, May 9, 2008, 2008 OJ (C115) 47. However, according to Joerges, the 
Maastricht Treaty, as the first step towards the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union 
 
4 On the “Polanyi in Brussels” debate about whether ECJ jurisprudence embeds markets in social arrangements, see 
Caropaso and Tarrow (2009) and Höpner and Schäfer (2010). 
5 Already by the 1970s, national administrations shifted from Keynesianism and the functional logic of bureaucracy 
to new institutional economics and public choice theory, which involved applying market values to theorize the 
functioning of the state and public sector institutions (Buchanan 1972; Ridley 1996). Especially from the 1980s 
onwards, an international trend of neoliberal reforms, including liberalization and privatization of social and public 
services, took place in several European countries, aspiring to “modernize” the state machinery on the basis of 
economic efficiency (Glyn 2006; Harvey 2005). 
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(EMU), was also a step towards “dejuridifying” the Economic Constitution. Indeed, the Stability 
and Growth Pact, designed to ensure budgetary stability after the introduction of the euro, also 
introduced political bargaining and unaccountable decision-making, based on non-justiciable 
criteria (Joerges 2004, 25). When a number of core EMU countries, including France and 
Germany, exceeded the 3% deficit limit set by the Pact, the prescribed penalties were circumvented 
by the Council, the discretion of which, “in particular on the basis of a different assessment of the 
relevant economic data,” was confirmed by the ECJ.  Case T-27/04, Commission of the European 
Communities v. Council of the European Union.  
 
The early tendencies of “de-juridification” identified by Joerges are indeed exacerbated in the post-
crisis, “managerial” economic governance of the EU, indicating a transformation of the Economic 
Constitution. This is primarily a result of the shift from a rigid understanding of the rule of law, 
safeguarding market freedoms and undistorted competition, to the singular, overarching objective 
of budgetary balance. In that direction, individualized consolidation measures, as introduced by 
the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) of 2011, are legitimated only via indeterminate 
clauses, raising serious questions about the rule of law and democratic accountability. Council 
Regulation 1174/2011, L 306 (EU). As openly stated in the Commission’s institutional paper on 
the MIP, “judgment plays a larger role in the MIP because there are no obvious rules-based criteria 
for the identification and assessment of macroeconomic imbalances” (European Commission 
2016). The broad executive discretion for identifying macroeconomic imbalances, as well as for 
suggesting and enforcing on member states measures for preventing or correcting them, 
concentrates significant authority in the Council and the Commission. Far from the depoliticizing 
effect of integration through law, this hyper-politicization of economic governance and the 
subsumption of the rule of law under the economic purposes it is meant to serve entails a risk of 
arbitrary rule and of discrediting the law. 
  
In the new architecture of economic governance, formalism and instrumentalism overlap and co-
exist, indicating that formalism is not a principle of government per se, but only instrumental. The 
new and stricter version of the Stability and Growth Pact—the Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union of 2012 (TSCG or “Fiscal Compact”)— 
reinforces the fixation on budgetary discipline, first, by refining the requirements for maximum 
debts and deficits into a detailed balanced-budget rule and, second, by imposing a “golden rule” 
of balanced budgets. This means that budgetary balance should be incorporated in national 
provisions of “permanent” character, hierarchically superior to ordinary legislation—that is, in 
provisions that are “preferably constitutional” (TSCG, Article 3(1); see also Fabbrini 2013). The 
Fiscal Compact also empowers the CJEU to scrutinize and enforce budgetary rules within member 
states under the threat of significant penalties, allowing for no variation among national economies 
with different needs and, eventually, leaving weak economies with no other option than austerity 
measures (Blyth 2013; Streeck 2014; Joerges 2014a). Decisions for structural reforms are 
dependent upon the calculation of structural deficits and the monitoring by independent Fiscal 
Advisory Councils composed of experts. While such calculations are highly contested, the 
supposed objectivity of the prescription is an avenue to depoliticize the debate around economic 
issues (Bilancetti 2019, 256). Rather than a consistent turn to formalism, the “golden rule,” like the 
MIP, is underpinned by highly political calculations and decisions (Everson 2013, 107).6  
 
The tendencies towards informality, politicization, and increasing reliance on non-justiciable 
criteria that have characterized the post-crisis EU economic governance dovetailed with a similarly 
pragmatic attitude of the Court. Tied to the Fiscal Compact was the establishment of the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM), designed to offer financial assistance to member states under strict 
 
6 On the formal legality of the TSCG, see Fischer-Lescano (2012b). 
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conditionality, including for example measures such as VAT increases, pension cuts, and the 
liberalization of public services (Scharpf 2011, 28). In the context of the Pringle case (Pringle,; 
Gauweiler, C-62/14, 2015), contesting the compatibility of ESM with EU law, the ECJ defined 
sound budgetary policy and the survival of the euro as a telos of the constitutional structure of the 
treaties, aligning its interpretation of the contested provisions with these overarching objectives. 
Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Government of Ireland; Case C-62/14, Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher 
Bundestag. Critical commentators have seen in this decision a departure from the law as it stands 
and a judicial legitimation of an essentially political decision (Joerges 2014b, 1011-1013), while 
others have been more positive in their evaluation (Craig 2013). 
 
Subsuming the rule of law under the objective of budgetary balance highlights that fundamental 
commitments of democratic constitutionalism, including representative democracy and the 
principle of legality, may be circumvented in order to maintain economic liberal commitments to 
price stability, competition, property rights, and the avoidance of moral hazard (Wilkinson 2019, 
102; Streeck 2016, 118-125). Yet, it would be a mistake to consider this an aberration or a 
fundamental deviation from the “ordoliberal doctrine” (Feld, Köhler, and Nientiedt 2015). 
Instead, it serves as a reminder that the ordoliberal Economic Constitution may be flexible in its 
form, but rigid in its ultimate purpose to safeguard these core economic liberal commitments, in 
their varied historical instantiations, from democratic contestation.7 In that sense, ordoliberalism 
is fundamentally a normative economic and political—and only secondarily a jurisprudential—
project. As such, it is alternative normative projects that can challenge its foundations. It is to such 
normative agendas and their vision for the role of law in the economy to which the article will now 
turn.  
III. First Direction: Negative Universalism 
The perceived debasement or, at least, the tenuous hold, of the Union on the rule of law provides 
fruitful ground for one of the responses to current modes of EU economic governance: a return 
and reinforcement of the rule of law, combined with institutional reforms, culminating in the vision 
of constitutionalization of transnational political authority and a reconfiguration of the demos. 
Acknowledging the systemic constraints imposed upon an interdependent world society, Jürgen 
Habermas endorses the position of extending democratic procedures beyond national borders as 
the only solution to questions of both governability (for example, control of financial markets) and 
legitimacy (Habermas 2012a, 2012b). According to Habermas, the current model of “executive 
federalism” reflects the reluctance of political elites to replace a regime that makes it possible to 
transfer market imperatives to national budgets without proper legitimation with a truly 
transnational democracy of argumentative conflict of opinions in the public arena—an essential 
prerequisite for deliberative processes of opinion- and will-formation (Habermas 2012b, 337-348). 
It is precisely these deliberative processes that make genuine consensus at least possible that can, 
therefore, provide a response to current democratic deficits (Habermas 1996). Following a 
different argumentative course but arriving at a conclusion comparable to those of Habermas, 
non-proceduralist accounts of post-national constitutionalism endorse the extension of 
constitutionalism beyond the state by reference to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. 
In particular, such accounts stress that a set of universal constitutional commitments, such as to 
the principles of legality, subsidiarity, participation, and rights-protection, can be derived from a 
 
7 In the case of the euro crisis, this meant, among other things, the prioritization of the interests of institutional 
investors, who had taken advantage of profit opportunities resulting from differences in interest rates within the 
eurozone, at the expense of European taxpayers (Varoufakis 2018, 8-29). The fiscal governance of the EU did not 
mitigate, but rather exacerbated the economic differences between North and South, by eventually supporting a 
growth model in which certain member states can maintain their positions as creditors, while the others will remain 
debtors (Bilancetti 2019, 262).      
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post-national constituent power that enables the search for a distinct sense of the public good or, 
slightly differently, from the underlying normative substratum of existing societies composed of 
free and equal individuals collectively acting to develop their conception of public good (Walker 
2012; Kumm 2011; Peters 2009). 
 
In both proceduralist and substantive accounts, constitutionalism is meant to set limits on state 
power—while, indirectly, it could entail limits for private power as well. Regardless of whether 
these limits flow from deliberative processes or from underlying normative principles, the vision 
of an at least possible universal consensus on certain fundamental human interests characterizes 
this approach to constitutionalism. Yet, if there is no universal position, there can be no 
universal—but only hegemonic—values. In that direction, feminist legal and political theory has 
highlighted that consensus cannot embody the desires of all participants equally—power 
differentials always remain (Fraser 1992; Cohen 1995). Could, nevertheless, a different 
constitutionalism—a “negative constitutionalism”—form the core of a critical response to the 
depoliticization of the economy and the expansion of market ordering?   
 
A constitutionalism of negativity is predicated upon a certain conceptualization of formalism. Far 
from a substantive understanding of formalism, as advocated by Hayek, this neo-formalism builds 
on the positivist view that the concept of the rule of law is primarily procedural and has no 
reference to the relation between the government and the governed, but is only concerned with 
the conformity of the application of the law to valid law as it has been created according to 
established procedures (Kelsen 1955). Crucially, such formal conceptions of the rule of law mean 
that no judgment is passed on the content of the rules themselves (Craig 2017).  
 
This is the direction in which the “culture of formalism,” suggested by Koskenniemi (2001), 
develops. Indeed, Koskenniemi agrees that formalism needs not be permanently associated with 
certain substantive outcomes—formalism can coexist with both just and unjust policies 
(Koskenniemi 2001, 503).  It is, in fact, the critique of formalism that has shown the actual 
disjunction between the letter of the law and the predictability of outcomes. Endorsing a claim of 
legal indeterminacy that results not only from semantic indeterminacy but, more fundamentally, 
from the contradictory premises and sources of law (Koskenniemi 2006a; Dagan 2007, 614), 
Koskenniemi underscores that it is a matter of political contestation to give the meaning of the 
rules one or the other direction. Yet, in this process of political contestation, there is a residue of 
universalism, a common space to which contesting sides can resort when claiming a right. According 
to Koskenniemi, “the emancipatory core, and the universalism of the culture of formalism, lies 
precisely in its resistance to subsumption under particularist causes” (Koskenniemi 2001, 503-504). 
This universalism is distinct from the one undergirding the abovementioned versions of 
constitutionalism. As Beckett correctly highlights, for Koskenniemi, critique presupposes the 
universal as a condition of possibility (Beckett 2006, 1062). While it may be impossible to articulate 
a “positive” universalism without resorting to some form of imperialism, the form of the law—
precisely because of law’s indeterminacy—functions as a vessel for any particular claim. As such, 
it enables particular identities and causes to make their claims in universal terms, transmitting them 
beyond their separate value-systems. Crucially, for these universal terms to steer clear of the 
dangers of imperialism and imposition of certain values on others, they must take a negative form: 
“lack of voice,” “lack of education,” “lack of economic justice.” This is a universalism that remains 
“empty, a negative instead of a positive datum;” it is a universalism of a horizon of possibility 
(Koskenniemi 2001, 506). 
 
For this line of thinking, the value of the law is the law itself or, more precisely, its form. 
(Koskenniemi 2006b). Koskenniemi clarifies that it is not the role of legal theories to provide 
resolutions to social problems (Koskenniemi 1999). In a similar vein, Everson suggests that “the 
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law can refuse to judge,” avoiding, in the case of European economic governance, its own 
“transformation into a complacent instrument of a totalizing economic outlook” (Everson 2019, 
402). The modest ambition of a “culture of formalism” would then be to set limits to the exercise 
of power and to undergird a social practice of accountability, openness, and equality, one not 
reducible to the political positions of the parties involved (Koskenniemi 2001, 500). In that sense, 
law is meant to be the space that guarantees that politics do not degenerate into a clash of 
incommensurate value-systems. By securing this gap between law and politics, while ensuring the 
existence of limits for both public and private power, formalism protects and enables democracy. 
Taking this point further, Brunkhost suggests that law has a hidden negativity, which consists in 
the fact that it enables calling power to account (Brunkhorst 2014). Yet, “calling to account” does 
not simply imply the exercise of granted rights through established institutions. Rather, it implies 
a “constitutional mindset” that is attuned to the utopian moment in law: the idea that law, due to 
its radical openness to interpretation, could mean something different than its current hegemonic 
instantiations. The predominance of one understanding of the law over another is eventually a 
matter of social struggle. Koskenniemi summarizes this point by pointing out that “the roots of 
transcendence lie in immanence” (Koskenniemi 2015, 1041). In other words, the legal form 
contains a trace of freedom; it is “at once emancipatory and repressive, normative and functional, 
and both sides of the law are in dialectical tension from the beginning” (Brunkhorst 2014, 132).  
 
Is negative universalism a normative project and, if so, how does it challenge the prioritization of 
liberal economic rationalities at the expense of democratic participation and of social, welfare, and 
environmental concerns—in short, how does it upend the Economic Constitution? “Positive” 
constitutionalism essentially focuses on institutional reforms and upholding the rule of law. 
Negative universalism resists the impulse to fix the universal in positive institutions and to outline 
straightforward institutional solutions; yet, it also relishes the power of positive law to draw limits 
on public and private power. For Koskenniemi, the force of positive law is the force to draw sharp 
lines in a fluid world of opportunity, which necessarily entails that “neither the revolutionary avant-
garde nor the manager of a transnational company likes them” (Koskenniemi 2015, 1042). In that 
sense, critically inclined neo-formalism would require respect for the form of the law, on the 
supranational, the international, and the national level. Formalism’s value, as outlined here, is 
predicated on the leeway the legal form secures for reinterpretations of the law and critiques that 
the legal system has distorted the principles that supposedly inform its own foundations.8  
 
Reducing the expectations from law to its role as a restraint of power brings to the foreground an 
established critique of the rule of law: Restraining power also prevents power’s benevolent 
exercise; the rule of law establishes formal equality but does not advance substantive equality 
(Horwitz 1977, 566). Furthermore, excessive faith in the indeterminacy of the legal form might 
engender the conclusion that the actual content of rules, whether advantageous for social causes 
or not, is eventually unimportant, thus undermining the importance of legal change (West 2011, 
157- 161). If the roots of transcendence lie indeed in immanence, then the content of norms sets 
boundaries on institutional imagination and shapes political possibility. In other words, if 
alternative legal orderings cannot be imagined except through some reference to existing ones, 
then it is also imperative to change existing ones. By assigning the question of legal change to the 
sphere of politics, with which it does not engage, negative universalism does not provide an avenue 
to think about legal change. In addition, it is hard to see how to escape from the currently 
hegemonic politicization of the law without achieving some other form of political hegemony, 
which in itself would politicize the law. The currently functionalist orientation of the Economic 
Constitution overlays the spectrum of possible meanings of the law with an overarching telos (for 
example, the safeguard of the euro, price stability, etc.) that has been hegemonically established. 
 
8  On “redemptive constitutionalism,” see Cover (1983, 33). 
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In that sense, the over-politicization of the legal framework places limits on the quest for negativity 
entailed by radical indeterminacy. Eventually, then, the weakness of negative universalism is that 
it responds to a pragmatic normative project of depoliticizing the economy that is flexible in the 
means it employs to achieve the desired ends with a principled, jurisprudential belief in the legal 
form as a vessel for possibly radical claims. Contrary to this vision of separating law from politics, 
instrumentalism attempts to respond to the ordoliberal challenge with a similar politicization of the 
law, only resting on different values.  
 
IV. Second Direction: Instrumentalism 
The second direction of critical engagement with the entrenchment of the Economic Constitution 
that I identify is that of instrumentalism—that is, using state law to advance goals of redistribution 
and democratic participation.  
 
Instrumentalism rests on the assumption that state law is constitutive of economic structures. This 
assumption has multiple conceptual roots: Polanyi’s analysis of how laissez-faire was planned and 
a product of legal ordering, rather than a natural development (Polanyi 2001 [1944]); a sociological 
jurisprudence that understands the legal system as intrinsic to the formation and reproduction of 
social systems (Kjaer 2020b); Legal Realist insights on how legal entitlements shape the bargaining 
power of different parties and generate economic value, having direct consequences for socio-
economic inequality (Hale 1923; Cohen 1935; see also Samuels 2007); and the focus of 
contemporary legal institutionalism on capitalism’s dependence upon general national systems of 
legal enforceability (Deakin et al. 2017). Overall, the instrumentalist position is undergirded by the 
notion that capitalism is a product of legal ordering, the fundaments of which are juridical equality 
and the delegation of productive activity to private agents (Dagan et al. 2020; Lang 2017; Boyer 
2001; Grewal 2014). Constitutional, counter-majoritarian mechanisms may then place further 
limits on the ability of people to radically revise the legal rules underlying commercial society, such 
as property rights and liberty of contract (Grewal 2014).  
 
Law is understood as the central mechanism of social power and not an epiphenomenon or a mere 
reflection of economic relations, contrary to what is usually presented as the Marxist view (Marx 
1990 [1867], 57, 178-179). In that direction, Pistor stresses that capital rules by law (Pistor 2019). 
Wealth creation is only possible thanks to a legal code backed by state power as, in the absence of 
legal enforcement, the legal privileges capital enjoys would not be respected. From Pistor’s 
perspective, the centrality of law for coding capital shifts the focus from class struggle to the 
question of “who has access to and control over the legal code and its masters” (Pistor 2019, 8). 
The importance of institutions (and hence, law) was also not overlooked in Piketty’s major work, 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Revisiting the main arguments of the book, Piketty warns against 
a simplified reading of his argument that because the rate of return on capital r exceeds the growth 
rate of the economy g, wealth inequality is destined to increase indefinitely over time (Piketty 2015). 
In fact, Piketty underscores that r > g is not the primary tool for examining changes in wealth and 
income in the twentieth century, pointing instead to institutional changes and political shocks 
(Piketty 2015, 67; Piketty, 2014). The focus on institutions echoes powerfully in Moyn’s suggestion 
that “there is no such thing as capitalism”—only institutional arrangements that improve or 
worsen inequality (Moyn 2014, 55). 
 
It follows from the constitutive function of law that the agent of legal ordering holds considerable 
power for the steering of society. As a source of inspiration, instrumentalism looks back at the 
trente glorieuses and the monumental reduction of inequality through bold institutional reforms. 
Indeed, the law of the welfare state expanded regulation and the use of the legal form (Kennedy 
2006), emphasized uniformity, and reinforced the role of the central authority and control (Ewald 
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1986), while it concretized a form of functionalism that conceived of the law purposively, as part 
of a process of social engineering (Loughlin 2005). The welfare state was intrinsically connected 
with the notion of democratic citizenship. In fact, as T. H. Marshall noted, the welfare state 
brought about an evolution in the notion of citizenship, transforming it from the fundamental 
architect of legitimate social inequality, to the main drive toward social equality (Marshall 1992, 7). 
In other words, the abstract, formal, juridical equality of modern citizenship that disregarded one’s 
actual position in society began to acquire a substantive content expressed through social rights, 
including these of fair wage, health care, and housing, but also through duties to the community, 
such as the duty to work (Marshall 1992, 45-46). The introduction of groups into the heart of 
private ordering and the “rematerialization of law” (for example, labor law, social law, tenancy law, 
consumer protection) were instrumental in concretizing a vision of the market as a political project 
(Bartl 2020, 236-238). According to Duguit’s early observation, such transformations indicated 
that “a legal system of realistic and socialist order replaced the previous metaphysical and 
individualistic legal system” (Duguit 1913, xi).  
 
It is on the basis of a profound connection between state regulation, intervention, and democratic 
citizenship that the instrumentalist position turns its attention to state power and governing by 
means of substantive legal rationalities. This aspiration to govern and to engage in ambitious, 
centralized, encompassing institutional designs could deliver on aspirations of equality (Moyn 
2018, 219; Pistor 2019, 233; Rosanvallon 2013, 273, 293). Similarly, as markets do not exist beyond 
state power, they can be redesigned to fulfill their ultimate purpose of promoting human 
flourishing, as opposed to sustaining wealth maximization (Harris and Varellas 2020, 5, 10). Unlike 
the hesitation of negative universalism (and of counter-hegemony, as I will show below) to derive 
institutional solutions from critique, the pragmatism of instrumentalism is reflected precisely in 
the elaboration of alternative institutional designs capable of achieving egalitarian and participatory 
outcomes. Extending beyond superficial remedies to neoliberalism’s most pernicious effects, such 
designs may range from redistributive policies, such as a progressive wealth tax (Piketty 2014), to 
structural reforms of monetary institutions inspired by legal analysis (Feichtner 2016), to 
normatively driven changes of substantive and procedural law in fields like corporate law (Ireland 
2010) or European private law (Collins 2008). Yet, taking into consideration the constitutive role 
of law in current regimes of hierarchy and inequality, legal strategies and interventions require re-
imagination and re-assessment if they can be instrumental in fulfilling the vision of a democratic 
political economy (Chadwick 2019, 18). 
 
Overall, an instrumentalist perspective implies an understanding of the law as non-autonomous, 
an empty vessel to be filled with substantive content that can either advance or hinder different 
normative agendas. To give shape and content to the law, which eventually shapes the economy 
and drives our normative universe, instrumentalism relies on democracy as a core principle. 
According to Mouffe, the main ideas of the democratic tradition are those of equality, identity 
between the governing and the governed, and popular sovereignty (Mouffe 2009). These ideas, 
Mouffe argues, tend to be forgotten in the contemporary identification of democracy solely with 
the liberal values of the rule of law, human rights, and individual liberty. The connection of these 
values to democracy is based on tangential historical articulation, rather than on the same 
philosophical roots (Mouffe 2009, 2-3; see also Gauchet 2017). The ensuing democratic deficit 
cannot be remedied through appeals to consensus and technocratic politics “without adversary” 
(Mouffe 1993). Instead, it can only be addressed through an agonistic understanding of democracy, 
which endorses political adversity, competing political visions, and the non-universal nature of 
political outcomes. Unlike the warnings of negative universalism against the conflation of law and 
politics and the preservation of a universal space to which particular claims can resort to, the 
instrumentalist position aspires to translate necessarily partial—but majoritarian—rationalities into 
regulatory action. The exercise of popular sovereignty encapsulates the moment of political possibility 
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as a rejection of the limits supposedly set by “the economy,” eventually also enabling the 
renegotiation or even the rejection of the broader limits placed by liberal institutions, such as 
property rights. 
 
The Economic Constitution of the EU appears designed to prevent the kind of agonistic 
contestation envisioned by instrumentalism. Its function is precisely to seal the capitalist principle 
of resource allocation, which operates on the basis of free market forces, from the democratic 
principle of resource allocation, which operates on the basis of social need and entitlement. This 
brings to the surface and intensifies the inherent tension that characterizes the institutions and 
functioning principles of democratic capitalism (Streeck 2011; Wilkinson 2019; Grewal and Purdy 
2014). The Economic Constitution limits the scope of political possibility, setting implicit bounds 
on what type of policies might be deemed feasible and which are not, such as, for example, the 
nationalization of banks (Grewal and Purdy 2014, 6). The perceived structural impossibility of 
popular sovereignty to penetrate the governance of the EU and shape the content of norms in the 
normative direction of equality and participatory parity prompts a skepticism about the EU. 
Indeed, proponents of views that fall within the spectrum of what I identify as the instrumentalist 
position share different degrees of doubt with regard to the potential of the current institutional 
framework of the EU—or even of supranational ordering in general—to deepen democracy and 
assert social over liberal economic priorities in new legal ascriptions (Grewal 2018; Streeck 2012; 
Scharpf 2014; Mitchell and Fazi 2017; but see Hennette et al. 2017). For some, this would only be 
possible following a set of structural changes capable of both embedding diversity and democratic 
participation in the government of the Union and of reversing its current structural orientation 
towards liberalization and the preservation of transnational flows—in short, following a 
reinvention of the Union (Scharpf 2014). 
 
While the optimism of the instrumentalist position about legal reform, its insistence on “political 
possibility,” and its focus on democratic participation and societal majorities as the primary lever 
for concretizing these aspirations are powerful, it is worth pondering whether it places too much 
faith in the ordering capacities of law and too little attention to the paradigm shift entailed by the 
processes of globalization (Michaels 2013). Perceiving law as eventually reducible to politics might 
obfuscate a reality in which the center of legal production shifts from the state to civil society 
(Merry 1988; Teubner 1996). Legal pluralism, for example in instances of transnational governance 
and private regulation, challenges instrumentalism by highlighting the plurality of actors that might 
be creating law and by drawing attention to forms of law that are not made deliberately (Taekema 
2017, 119; Santos 2002). In this fragmented globalization, politics does not necessarily drive legal 
change, and the politicization of new transnational normative orders needs to find new ways of 
articulation (Zumbansen forthcoming). In addition, transnational economic integration and the 
structural power of private financial interests might insulate existing power relations beyond 
attempts of legal transformation through “automatic punishment mechanisms,” such as capital 
flight, increased interest rates, skyrocketing sovereign debt, rating downgrades, and disinvestment 
(Lindblom 1982; Roos 2019). This is particularly true for countries that lack the ordering capacities 
or the monetary sovereignty of strong global economies, like the US (Henwood 2019). Without 
developed mechanisms of global justice, redistribution, and transnational welfare, and absent a—
highly improbable—coordinated inter-state effort to curb the structural power of private financial 
interests by means of international legal instruments, the instrumental approach appears to be 
missing the instruments that would allow it to become fully purposive and effective in the 
globalized economy of the twenty-first century. Importantly, this is not only—even if it is also—
a question of technicalities, such as developing legal fixes against capital flight. If the 
instrumentalist approach is to be loyal to its grounding in popular sovereignty, equality, and 
democratic allocation of resources, the question of the transnational constitution of the demos 
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and the guaranteeing of “voice” and input legitimacy become fundamental, and not yet answered, 
questions.     
 
Furthermore, the emphasis on the constitutive function of the law, if taken to an extreme, may 
lead to the rather one-dimensional prescription of “capturing the state,” including its powers of 
“legal coding” and monopoly of force, as the method for social transformation. Such an approach 
seems to take the determinant role of the economy too lightly. The pursuit of transforming the 
economy through incremental legal reforms does not take fully into account the unmalleability of 
the social power that lies in social relations of production and its resistance to grand realignment 
projects. Could, for example, the law ever abolish wage labor as the form of exploitation in 
capitalist societies (Selwyn and Miyamura 2014)? Marxist critiques, even if sensitive to the social 
constitution of the economy and wary of the flexibility, or even artificiality, of the base–
superstructure divide, stress the limits of the liberal legal form in achieving social transformation 
(Wood 2016; Baars 2019). While nothing a priori precludes radical possibilities through, for 
example, “non-reformist reforms” (Gorz 1987), the expectation of unilateral, top-down social 
transformation by means of legal instruments, only with the backing of popular sovereignty, 
appears to underestimate the social forces and relations of production that participate in the 
creation and the shaping of law and ideology in the first place (Althusser 2014 [1971]). This 
skepticism does not point only to the correlation of wealth and political influence, lobbying, and 
possible regulatory capture, but more deeply to the notion that certain fundamentals of capitalist 
societies, such as property rights or the driving force of profit-making, could not be thoroughly 
reconfigured without also altering the fabric of society. The resultant risk that the instrumentalist 
position might be reduced to a project of limited reformism opens the way for counter-hegemony and 
its focus on civil society, pluralism, and, in some cases, the cultivation of structures of direct 
democracy beyond institutionalization. 
 
V. Third Direction: Counter-Hegemony 
As counter-hegemonic, I categorize the approaches that tend to resist the subsumption of 
emancipatory politics under the umbrella of state power. The concept of “hegemony” is meant to 
draw attention to the importance of the political and ideological superstructure, including culture, 
in maintaining the relations of the economic base (Gramsci 2011). In that direction, a key element 
of the diverse array of approaches I identify as counter-hegemonic responses to the liberalization 
of the economy and the sidelining of social welfare concerns is the importance of civil society and 
its differentiation from the market. An attachment to normative pluralism, decentralization, and 
human rights, or, in some cases, to social struggles and a broader notion of utopianism, concretizes 
the shared discomfort with a unitary determination of the normative foundations of law. Instead, 
counter-hegemonic approaches look to the meaning created by societal processes of contestation, 
or even to the disruption of established institutions as an end in itself. Within the category of 
counter-hegemony, I distinguish between, on one hand, theoretical endeavors invested in the 
project of democratizing the economy from within, drawing from a system-theoretical conceptual 
background (Luhmann 2008; Teubner 1993), and, on the other hand, broader and more holistic 
oppositions to the congealment of social hierarchy that focus on the value of critique itself 
(Douzinas and Warrington 1995; Lacey 1996; Brown and Halley 2002; Tushnet 2011).     
 
The first set of approaches recognizes that the constitutional question has moved beyond the 
containment of state interference in individual freedoms, to the simultaneous protection and 
limitation of the autonomy of functionally differentiated social systems, including the economy 
(Teubner 2012; Fischer-Lescano 2016). Contesting modernity’s fixation on a singularity of Reason 
and embracing the functional differentiation of contemporary society, Gunther Teubner’s societal 
constitutionalism rejects the complete reliance on the state for projects of social transformation, 
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stressing the impossibility of comprehensive ex ante regulation (Teubner 2011a, 5; Streeck 2009, 
236). Such regulation is not only technically impossible, due to the lack of centralized knowledge 
and enforcement capacity, but it also corresponds to the aspiration that one system—politics— 
represent the whole of society. This aspiration contains a latent and looming threat of 
totalitarianism (Teubner 2011a, 36-37). Instead, social change could be envisioned as taking place 
within the internal functioning of social systems.  
 
In such an institutional imaginary, the role of the law should not be the top-down imposition of 
substantive rationalities, but rather the enhancement of self-reflective capacities and the promotion 
of the self-limitation of social systems (Teubner 1983; Zumbansen 2008). The public/private 
dichotomy needs to cede its place to a multiplicity of social perspectives and a pluralism of partial 
rationalities within each system (Teubner 2012). This project of “polycontexturality” implies that 
social systems should not be allowed to express exclusively “public” or exclusively “private” 
rationalities. In other words, the economy, one social system among others, cannot be constituted 
solely by the drive of profit-maximization, but must incorporate public rationalities, such as respect 
for human rights, within its ambit: The economy needs to be democratized from within. While the 
role of state law is crucial in enabling and facilitating such a transition, concrete limitations on the 
destructive expansion of social systems, such as effective elimination of poor working conditions, 
will be the result of system-specific logic. This is because the necessary knowledge for inhibiting 
such expansion cannot be built from an external observation point, such as that of the state 
(Teubner 2011a, 14). Therefore, state law must leave space for, and even facilitate, the 
development of a multiplicity of “irritations” and “learning pressures,” including reputational 
sanctions, that have the capacity to trigger the desired self-limitation (Fischer-Lescano 2016, 167; 
Thornhill 2013). Social movements, media pressure, boycott campaigns, NGO action, and judicial 
control are some of the mechanisms that could steer the narrow path between external 
interventions and self-regulation (Teubner 2011a, 2011b).  
 
The agenda of democratizing the economy from within means that the social cannot be 
disconnected from, but rather needs to permeate markets, for example through the development 
of a societal private law, a crucial element of which is business responsibilities towards third parties 
(Micklitz 2018). Similarly, corporate codes can be understood as a force of self-limitation and as 
emerging “civil constitutions,” explicitly recognizing a direct effect of human rights on private 
actors (Teubner 2011b; Kampourakis 2019). Human rights function as “social and legal counter-
institutions to the expansive tendencies of the economic system” (Teubner 2011c, 210) and, as 
such, they become essential in this decentralized perspective of social transformation 
(Christodoulidis 2017). Societal collisions, like those arising from the unfettered expansion of 
economic rationalities, need to be seen in their fundamental rights dimension. In turn, this allows 
conceptualizing the horizontal effect of human rights beyond their protective effect only on victims 
of human rights violations by private actors, especially corporations. Rather, the horizontal effect 
of human rights captures their potential to become a shield of protection of societal spheres of 
autonomy against the destructive effects of the expansion of social systems. In essence, human 
rights prevent one single rationality, for instance the economy, from dominating society (Teubner 
2006, 2011c; Fischer-Lescano 2016; Viellechner 2020).  
 
However, inherent in this sociologically oriented approach is the risk of reifying the unequal social 
and market power behind the different forces of “self-limitation.” Societal constitutionalism relies 
on a social sphere that has already been shaped and determined by patterns of social hierarchy and 
distributional inequality. The shift from the legal centralism of the instrumental approach to social 
expectations and self-limiting norms emerging from societal pressures, such as consumer 
pressures, might deprive those who do not have the means to shape normative outcomes through 
their social/market activity from the capacity to co-determine normative outcomes (Kampourakis 
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forthcoming; see also Christodoulidis 2013). It suffices to think of the importance of reputational 
sanctions as “learning pressures” for the process of self-limitation and the vastly different 
capacities of individuals to inflict such sanctions, for example depending on the location of the 
actors in question (Global North/Global South) or the capacity for investment and consumption. 
In addition, contrary to the paradigm of legal centralism and its reliance on the abstract equality of 
citizenship and democratic participation to decide upon common, inter-subjective interest, the 
epistemology of system-theoretical approaches rejects the possibility of knowledge of other 
systems’ workings, eventually relying on self-change within delineated spheres of autonomy.9 This 
defeats the possibility of ambitious, centripetal projects of social engineering (Blankenburg 1984). 
 
Nevertheless, this sociological, pluralistic agenda for the limitation of economic rationalities can 
also be understood as not having a linear normative impetus, thus resisting its reduction into 
specific institutional blueprints (Teubner 1989, 152). Such a “critical systems theory” (Kjaer 2006, 
77; Fischer-Lescano 2012a) and an open reading of societal constitutionalism place no 
predetermined limits on the content and form of the various, decentralized, social constitutions. 
In a sense, the focus on the different ecologies of justice draws attention to the possibility of 
subverting law’s self-descriptions, and captures the idea that justice through law is unattainable—
in its realization, it creates new injustice (Teubner 2009). This dovetails with a tendency that 
characterizes the second set of approaches captured here as counter-hegemonic.  
 
In these approaches, legal reforms are understood as inherently limited and, as such, a special role 
is reserved for the critical practice itself and the utopian energies it might catalyze. Avoiding the 
temptation to outline alternative social arrangements, critique needs to be sensitive to the notion 
that law is only one among multiple interrelated social frameworks in which social hierarchies 
might be instantiated (Lacey 1996, 146; Norrie 1993; Smart 1989). Dreaming up of blueprints ends 
up reflecting a “totalizing impulse” to affix stable meanings to social practices. Instead, what is 
sought is a form of utopianism and the articulation of an ethical project—not through 
metaphysical prescriptions, but rather through deconstruction and the openness of meaning 
(Cornell 1992), the imagination of the impossible (Irigaray 1992), and the ethics of alterity. 
Approaching the question of justice through the infinite responsibility to the Other means that, 
eventually, justice lies beyond the law (Douzinas and Warrington 1995; Loumansky 2006; 
Diamantides 2007). The law can only approach it—but never achieve it—by reference to its negative 
(Derrida 1992, 22). The lived experiences of injustice constitute the passage through which justice 
can become manifest—not as a result of the injustice itself, but because of the utopian energies it 
activates (Fischer-Lescano 2012a, 11). This utopianism may be found in social movements that 
engage in a continuous project of imagination beyond the conceptual limits of the present (Evans 
2008), an imagination that would be killed in the moment of its institutionalization in law. Legal 
reforms could possibly be an “end of politics” (Lacey 1996; Tushnet 2011). 
 
Indeed, the dynamics of social struggles against austerity in Europe have often been found in 
“extra-institutional spaces” (Rajagopal 2003, 235) that attempt to envision participatory, bottom-
up routes to economic equality (Kinna, Prichard, and Swann 2019; Simiti 2014), including, for 
example, the protection of the commons (Bailey and Mattei 2013). Yet, the relationship between 
utopian thinking and institutionalization is more complicated than the aphorism “end of politics” 
implies. Subaltern actors in the Global South have challenged dominant forms of economic 
governance by using the law and reconfiguring hegemonic practices—integrating state law and 
rights in broader social struggles (Rodríguez-Garavito and Arenas 2005; Santos 2002). The role of 
rights, and specifically of social rights, is critical in both crystallizing a form of solidarity that 
 
9 On the overlap between the Hayekian theory of knowledge and systems theory, see Slobodian (2018, 224-235) and 
Goldmann (2018, 335). 
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challenges the “totality” of market activity (Christodoulidis 2017) and in informing and inspiring 
grassroots practices and instances of bottom-up normative pluralism that can democratize the 
economy, such as, for example, participatory budgeting (Santos 2005). The language of human 
rights can amplify the voices of individuals, communities, and trade unions in the deliberative 
process, because it functions as visible inscription of equality, scandalising existing exclusions and 
enabling its addressees to “make something out of that inscription” (Rancière 2004, 303; 
O’Connell 2014, 73; Möller 2011, 308).  
 
However, the concrete European experience of the financial crisis highlighted some of the limits 
of this approach, as the various decentralized social movements did not manage to formulate the 
concrete processes by which their goals could be realized in the social order. The arguable failure 
of anti-austerity struggles was often preceded by a canalization of the struggle to the political 
sphere and the attempt for centripetally organized social transformation. The inscription of social 
rights, as for example in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights or in European constitutions, 
could have enabled—and to a certain extent did enable—the search for a normative substratum 
against policies that prioritized market imperatives over social welfare. Yet, if the control of 
centralized law-production may not be enough to reverse structures of economic inequality, as 
hinted above, the lack of such control makes the undertaking of redistributive and participatory 
transformations appear almost impossible.  
 
VI. (Non-)Concluding Thoughts: LPE in Europe  
Having briefly visited some of the critiques against the Economic Constitution and the 
depoliticization of the economy it entails, as well as some of the blind spots and shortcomings of 
these critiques in outlining the role of law for social transformation, I am brought to the issue of 
the added value and contribution of an emerging LPE-in-Europe research agenda. How would 
such an agenda differentiate itself from previous critiques, and what could it contribute to 
envisioning a democratic political economy across the continent? My thoughts here are tentative, 
and this is a field in its early stages of development in Europe.10 Indeed, the following reflections 
are only meant to contribute to and hopefully to enrich ongoing processes of discourse 
formulation. 
 
One aspect of LPE that resonates in relevant scholarship in Europe (Kjaer 2020, Chadwick 2019, 
Lang 2017) is the constitutive role of law in economic life. Functioning as a binding factor for 
scholarship across legal fields and national differences, the acknowledgement of law’s constitutive 
role paves the way for methodological commonality and an exercise in deciphering how legal 
arrangements may be responsible for perpetuating inequalities and hierarchies along lines of 
gender, race, and class. Yet, the recognition that law generates private power is not in itself 
sufficient to flesh out a research agenda if not coupled with either an elaborate theoretical 
framework, or a normative framework that provides an answer as to what motivates such research 
and what its goals are. 
    
In sketching such a normative framework, a potential component is the articulation of legal critique 
from the standpoint of a commitment to egalitarian and democratic ideals that are integral in the 
 
10 Most notably, so far, through the organisation of the workshop “Law and Political Economy in Europe” at the 
Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies in October 2019 (for the relevant blog series, see 
https://lpeproject.org/blog/law-and-political-economy-in-europe-transnationalizing-the-discourse), the Ius 
Commune Workshop in November 2020, and the publication of the edited volume by Poul F. Kjaer, The Law of 
Political Economy: Transformation in the Function of Law, in 2020 (for a relevant blog series, see 
https://verfassungsblog.de/what-comes-after-neoliberalism-2). 
Kampourakis, Bound by the Economic Constitution   Journal of Law and Political Economy 
319 
 
emancipatory urge to “create a world which satisfies the needs and powers of human beings” 
(Purdy, Kapczynski, and Grewal 2017; Harris and Varellas 2020, 10; Horkheimer 1972, 246). More 
than a simple moral condemnation of capitalist society, the assumption of such a standpoint could 
be an instance of immanent critique, in the sense that it involves the claim that the currently 
predominant liberal capitalism does not fulfill its own promises (Stahl 2013; Antonio 1981): 
Freedom is understood only negatively as the absence of state coercion, failing to reflect the 
“freedom from want;” equality is reduced to equality of opportunity, which functions as a 
legitimation of substantive inequality; formal justice is structured to reflect market and social 
power; and democratic institutions do not truly reflect the ideals of public autonomy and 
participatory parity. Of course, the meaning of both the criticized normative standards and the 
ideals they might engender is historically contingent and open to interpretation and 
contextualization, inevitably giving rise to internal debates about their meaning. Yet, the 
contestation about this meaning grounds legal and political claims and provides a vector for critical 
legal projects. This means that critique cannot be merely jurisprudential, reducible to the exposure 
of law as one more instance of politics, power, and ideology. Such critique can be co-opted or be 
structurally ambiguous, as it makes no claim about what kind of law could ground and be grounded 
on a different form of power. For instance, the critique against the over-politicization of the post-
crisis economic governance of the EU and against the disregard for the rule of law has proven to 
be normatively ambiguous, in certain cases motivated by values antithetical to the ideals of a more 
democratic, social, and participatory Europe (Beck 2019).  
 
Furthermore, the normative framework of the LPE agenda would endorse the drive to translate 
critique into legal and institutional change, without nevertheless fetishizing institutional reform 
and without reducing the critical dimension of the project to merely policy advocacy. Indeed, not 
all endeavors to shape collective life take a legalistic form (Brown and Halley 2002, 19). However, 
recognizing the constitutive role of law for the economy harbors the idea that the economy is a 
human creation and, as such, it could be radically different. This could bring LPE closer to the 
instrumentalist camp. Highlighting the contingency and the political underpinnings—as opposed 
to the supposed necessity, neutrality, and objectivity—of the European Constitution is then 
coupled with the idea that the legal structures that make it up can and should be changed. In that 
sense, and further advancing the point that critique cannot be solely jurisprudential, holding on to 
indeterminacy as the gate for radical transformation, as suggested to an extent by negative 
universalism and by certain currents of Critical Legal Studies, runs the risk of obscuring the need 
for concrete change in the content of the law (West 2011, 157-161). If the normative anchor of 
LPE in Europe is a commitment to the idea that all people living in Europe should be the authors 
of the laws governing their lives, as well as a striving for egalitarianism in the allocation of resources 
and for a sustainable future, then LPE in Europe would confront the national and supranational 
legal structures that oppose such aspirations. If the supranational legality of the EU appears 
impenetrable to struggles for democratic participation and egalitarian distribution, then a research 
agenda on LPE in Europe involves exploring the institutional reforms that would make this type 
of politicization possible. 
  
Finally, recognizing the need for legal and institutional change involves a quest for the democratic 
and public power-building that can achieve this change. This signifies a commitment to democratic 
participation as a value in itself, reflecting a rejection of paternalism and a demand for private and 
public autonomy. While the positive outlook on public power differentiates LPE from a line of 
critique that targets the ubiquity of power and the subjectification it entails, it also should not lead 
to a fetishization of the state as the sole locus of power. As mentioned in the discussion of 
instrumentalism, loyally following the blueprint of the welfare state is not an adequate model for 
the globalized economy of the twenty-first century. Democratic and public power could be 
constituted in multiple ways and in different arenas where power is exercised by non-governmental 
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actors, including, for example, instances of transnational private regulation or the governance of 
supply chains (Teubner 2011d, 122; Dias-Abey 2019). In that regard, LPE in Europe could draw 
from the decentralizing and pluralistic impetus of counter-hegemony. This is also an invitation for 
institutional imagination and for the kind of internationalism and cooperation that can inform 
both trans-national and sub-national constitutions of the demos.  
 
Establishing a research agenda on the basis of, on one hand, shared conceptual and methodological 
starting points and, on the other hand, fragments of a normative vision as to what might be the 
substance, the driving force, and the telos of such an agenda points to the political and pragmatic 
dimensions of the LPE agenda. While this political dimension and pragmatism—whereby ideas 
and concepts arise from behavior and action—can function as a centripetal force for the research 
agenda, it need not limit the boundaries of LPE as a scholarly project. Indeed, the need to further 
elaborate the genealogies, concepts, nuances, methodologies, and interdisciplinary connections 
employed by future scholarship is itself an open question and part of the project of the 
establishment of a research agenda. The theoretical development of key concepts, including that 
of power (Johns 2020), will also determine the kind of “transformativeness” promised by LPE. 
The political dimension of an LPE-in-Europe agenda is then tuned to the possibly transformative 
role of law for society and the economy. The discussion of the Economic Constitution highlighted 
the pragmatism that underlies the project of depoliticizing the economy. Upending a pragmatic 
and flexible normative project requires a similarly flexible and mobile critical practice.11 In that 
sense, contextually driven performances of eclectic elements of all three of the approaches 
mentioned above could contribute to fleshing out an alternative vision of a democratic political 
economy through a process of “principled opportunism” (Knox 2009, 433). Drawing from 
Poulantzas, it could be argued that challenging the insulation of the economy from democratic 
contestation needs to take place on two different levels. First, on the level of system immanence: 
in other words, on the “strategic terrain constituted by the state,” which involves the attempt to 
employ state power to deliver legal change that reflects such normative commitments. Following 
on instrumentalism, the role of societal majorities, electoral mobilizations, centralized politics, and 
regulatory action is important in that regard. Second, on the level of system transcendence: not 
unlike counter-hegemonic approaches, this refers to a “parallel struggle” outside institutions, with 
the goal being to cultivate structures of direct democracy and participation at the base of society, 
directly challenging the social power embedded in relations of production (Poulantzas and Martin 
2008, 338). A call for a flexible critical practice with fixed normative commitments to democratic 
participation and egalitarian allocation of resources eventually also means interweaving the 
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